Afghanistan

Our piecemeal approach to Iraq and Afghanistan are a mistake. I have long argued (since late 2001) that immediately after 9-11 we should have stated to the world our intention as a nation to defeat al-Qaeda and their extremist allies. We should have recognized it was a long-term venture and likened it to our commitment to defeat Soviet communism in the Cold War. In other words, that we view terrorism as a scourge to the civilized world and that we would lead a multi-year, multi-national coordinated military, diplomatic, trade and cultural effort of like-minded nations to eradicate it. This would give us the ability to implement an integrated national security strategy and architecture designed around our values and long-term security interests.

Unfortunately, the post 9-11 world didn’t unfold that way and we are now engaged on two foreign battlefields in military actions that most people – including many of those in the national security structure of the United States – view as disparate.

As a candidate for president, then-Senator Barak Obama said repeatedly that the fight in Afghanistan was the good war as compared to Iraq -- that it was a “war of necessity.” As president, Barak Obama stated in August of this year that our goals are to, “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies.”

Upon assuming the presidency, Mr. Obama named a new commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, charged with a strategic review and development of a go-forward plan. General McChrystal has made his recommendations to the president, yet it is only now that the debate on how to proceed has begun in the White House.

You would think that given his statements during the 2008 campaign and subsequent appointment of General McChrystal that President Obama would already have a fairly clear idea as to the broad course of action he would like to take in Afghanistan. If he believes what he has consistently said over the past year, that the fight in Afghanistan is a war of necessity and should be focused on the defeat of al-Qaeda, then the overriding consideration must be to support and strengthen Afghanistan in order to deny safe-havens to al-Qaeda and its extremist allies.

Muddling through with a strategy based upon political calculus rather than a military and diplomatic one would destroy the Obama presidency, and even more catastrophic, severely damage the long-term interests of the United States. One need only look at the Johnson presidency to see the parallels. The failure of President Johnson and his political advisors to let the military fight the war in Vietnam without the imposition of domestic political considerations led not only to our withdrawal and perceived defeat there, which was damaging enough, but it also led to an aggressive Soviet expansion in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.

Similarly, if we fail in Afghanistan the consequences will be far-reaching: al-Qaeda and extremist groups everywhere will know that America and the West are not serious and can be defeated if they are patient, cost us enough money and inflict enough pain; the al-Qaeda terrorist network and like-minded groups will again have a safe-haven in a lawless country; that these groups can continue unfettered in gaining immense amounts of cash to finance their operations through the opium trade; and, a destabilized Afghanistan could easily cause problems in neighboring countries.

Individuals and groups in Afghanistan and elsewhere are constantly judging the United States’ actions in the world based on their calculus, not our domestic political considerations. Failure, defeat or simply leaving where we have made a commitment makes them less likely to support or work with us in their country. These important potential internal allies will ask themselves, “Why risk everything if the Americans will leave when the going gets tough?”

So, what should we do? I agree with the President and his national security team’s assessment that the fight in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda has been ill-defined, under-resourced, under-funded and under-manned. I also agree with General McChrystal that we must implement a coherent and comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign built on the lessons learned in Iraq.

However, I would caution that Iraq and Afghanistan are inherently different and cannot be directly compared. Success in Afghanistan will be much harder than Iraq. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is backward, impoverished, tribal, mountainous, drug-ridden, decentralized, violent, has endemic corruption and a largely illiterate population. One important thing in common, though, is that the successful resolution of the challenges we face in Iraq and Afghanistan have ramifications for American foreign policy and our standing in the world long after we withdraw.

With this understanding as background, it is very important for President Obama to clearly and vividly articulate how he defines success in Afghanistan coupled with his vision of how Afghanistan will look after we leave. What are the mission parameters and how will we judge success?

At a minimum, one vision of success is a stable Afghanistan with a functioning government able to provide security to its population. It will likely take 15-20 years to get to this point.

What strategies would help to achieve this? Due to space limitations, I briefly outline the following:

Engaged military leadership. Those we ask to serve and lead troops in Afghanistan must fully understand counterinsurgency and align military strategy to the end-state vision articulated by the president. They must also understand where this fight fits into the larger national security strategy of the United States.

A coherent civil-military strategy. Many of our NATO allies (we must not forget that this is a NATO operation) have much more experience than do we in implementing these strategies. We have built our military to be a war-fighting force. Our troops excel at force-on-force and small-unit warfare, and they can help to provide a secure environment for the Afghan population – this is an important first step, but only one part of a broad civil-military strategy.

Other countries have forces and experience suited to additional areas of a successful civil-military strategy. These are based on linguistic skills and cultural and religious understanding of the population; capacity-building of political institutions, but especially training of the Afghan National Army as well as police forces, in which the French and British have a lot of experience (as do we); building and training a civil service and legal system based on merit rather than on tribal affiliations. Again, NATO and the United Nations can and should assist in these efforts, as well as non-governmental organizations, many of which have a wealth of experience.

A clearly-articulated and attainable mission. General McChrystal has advanced a military strategy, but this needs to be consistent with our overarching national security strategy. One area that I think we need to be cognizant of and integrate into our planning is that Afghanistan is not only a terrorist haven with a dysfunctional government, but it is also a narco-state. Anti-drug strategies need to be built into our mission parameters. Here, we can learn from our efforts in cooperation with the Columbians; we have roughly 20 years of experience that we can draw on to help combat the opium trade in Afghanistan.

Proper resources aligned to the attainment of mission goals. Without the equipment, manpower and financial resources, mission goals cannot be met.

Additional buy-in from our NATO allies. If President Obama outlines a clear and compelling vision and a realistic and properly-resourced strategy for reaching that vision, it is quite likely that our NATO allies will recommit themselves to the Afghan mission – perhaps other nations too. However, this is closely tied to…

Increased diplomatic efforts. We need to remind our NATO allies and like-minded countries that the United States of America is fully committed to success in Afghanistan. We need to also remind the international community, but especially Afghanistan’s neighbors, that there is more at stake than simply the people and government of Afghanistan. A destabilized Afghanistan could easily spill over and disrupt Pakistan, which has a nuclear arsenal. Afghanistan’s border countries are not as stable as they should be: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan all have tribal and inter-religious undercurrents that could be destabilized by a failed mission in Afghanistan. The Iranian leadership is looking increasingly shaky in terms of its hold on power. The entire region itself is an important crossroads for natural resources and trade, and this is clearly of interest both to China (which shares a border with Afghanistan) and India (which shares a border with Pakistan); we must find ways to tie these two countries, as well as Russia, to the mission in Afghanistan.

The United States cannot have a sustained, open-ended, on-the-ground military commitment to Afghanistan or indeed any country. However, pursuing strategies such as these would support and rally our troops in the field; strengthen the resolve of our allies and potential allies; show American leadership; allow us to come out on the other side with a clear victory for civilization; and, most importantly, help to ensure our long-term national security.